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Abstract
We investigate the properties of a family of social evaluation functions and inequality indices
which merge the features of the family of Atkinson (1970) and S−Gini (Donaldson and
Weymark (1980, 1983), Yitzhaki (1983) and Kakwani (1980)) indices. Income inequality
aversion is captured by decreasing marginal utilities, and aversion to rank inequality is
captured by rank−dependent ethical weights, thus providing an ethically−flexible dual basis
for the assessment of inequality and equity. These social evaluation functions can be
interpreted as average utility corrected for the illfare of relative deprivation. They can
alternatively be understood as averages of altruistic well−being in a population. They
moreover have a simple graphical interpretation.
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We investigate the properties of a family of social evaluation functions and of inequality indices
which merge the features of two popular classes of inequality indices. Our social evaluation func-
tions, denoted by W½;², are indeed a combination of the family of Atkinson (1970) indices, char-
acterised by a normative parameter ² of aversion to income inequality, and of the family of S-Gini
(or Single-parameter Gini) indices of Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983) and Yitzhaki (1983)
(see also Kakwani (1980)), characterised by an analogous normative parameter ½ of aversion to
rank inequality.
The Atkinson family of social evaluation functions is traditionnally linked to utilitarianism
and to expected utility theory in the risk literature; the cost of risk and inequality is captured by
decreasing marginal utilities of income. The S-Gini social evaluation functions come from a gen-
eralisation of the most common index of inequality, the Gini index, and emphasize the importance
of ranks and interpersonal comparisons in making social welfare assessments. The ethical criteria
of our own social evaluation functions correspondingly rely on the use of decreasing (individual or
social) marginal utilities of incomes to capture the dispersion of incomes around their mean value,
and on the use of rank-dependent ethical weights to capture the dispersion of ranks in a population.
The link of these social evaluation functions with both classical utilitarianism and rank-based
measures allows one easily to check the ethical sensitivity to rank and income dispersion in mea-
suring overall inequality. It also makes the social evaluation functions amenable to the study of
features of equity which are variably dependent on either of these two aspects of dispersion. This
is the case, for instance, of the study of horizontal inequity, which can be concerned either with the
tax-induced dispersion of incomes at a given rank in the population, or with the changes in ranks
induced by a tax and beneﬁt system.
We introduce the general formulation of our social evaluation functions in Section 2. This gen-
eral formulation appears utilitarian in format, but differs from the traditional utilitarian approach
through the use of rank-dependent weights on the utilities. For these social evaluation functions
to fulﬁll the axioms which characterise the S-Gini indices and for them to yield relative inequal-
ity indices, they must further take the particular form of W½;². The associated relative inequality
indices are also deﬁned, in a discrete and in a continuous setting. Section 3 then shows how the
social evaluation functions can be interpreted as average utility corrected for relative deprivation
in individual utility. Section 4 also links the social evaluation functions to averages of altruistic
well-being in the population. In other words, the social evaluation functions take into account in-
terpersonal comparisons in a way which can be interpreted either as resentments for one’s relative
deprivation, or as concerns for the welfare of others. Section 5 provides a brief graphical inter-
pretation of the indices, and Section 6 concludes. The appendix contains the proofs of all of the
propositions.
2 A class of social evaluation functions
For the discrete setting, we suppose that there are n individuals in the population, with (positive)
incomes denoted by yi, and ordered such that y1 ¸ y2 ¸ ::: ¸ yn¡1 ¸ yn. Let y = (y1;y2;¢¢¢ ;yn)
be the vector of incomes; hence y 2 Rn
+, the n¡dimensional positive orthant. A general form for










where U(y) is interpreted as a utility function that is continuous and increasing in y and where
gn
i is a positive weight applied on the utility U(yi) of individual i. Without loss of generality, we
normalise the ﬁrst weight, gn
1, to 1 throughout the paper.
As is conventional in the literature, we can deﬁne an equally distributed equivalent income (or
EDE income, which is a money-metric measure of social welfare) »n(y) : Rn
+ ! R, as:
W
n(»
n(y) ¢ 1) = W
n(y) (2)





with U¡1(¢) being the inverse utility function. From this, we can follow convention and deﬁne for
(1) an index of inequality In(y) as:
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where ¹(y) = n¡1 Pn
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We focus in this paper on social evaluation functions which yield relative inequality indices.




for all ¸ > 0 and for all y 2 Rn
+.
Formulation (1) has a clear utilitarian ﬂavour, but differs from the traditional utilitarian speci-
ﬁcation by the presence of the rank-dependent weights gn
i . The formulation also replaces income
by income utility in the locally income linear — or generalised Gini — formulations of Donaldson
and Weymark (1980) and Mehran (1976). Generalised Ginis are deﬁned by In(y) in equation (4)
with U(y) = y. The formulation is also linked to rank-dependent expected utility theory, as noted
in Chew and Epstein (1989) and Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994).
As Sen (1973, p.39) argues, U(yi) can be an individual utility function, or it can be the “com-
ponent of social welfare corresponding to person i, being itself a strictly concave function of in-
dividual utilities”. Sen also adds that “it is fairly restrictive to think of social welfare as a sum of
individual welfare components” (p.39), and that one might feel that “the social value of the welfare
of individuals should depend crucially on the levels of welfare (or incomes) of others” (p.41). As
we will see clearly later, the formulation of equation (1) allows precisely for this by applying rank-
dependent weights on each individual utility component U(yi). Only in the simple case of gn
i being
a constant across i do we obtain the traditional utilitarian formulation. Moreover, as Ben Porath
and Gilboa (1994, p.445) note, “the most salient drawback of linear measures [i.e., generalised
Ginis] is that the effect on social welfare of a transfer of income from one individual to another
2depends only on the ranking of the incomes but not on their absolute levels”. This drawback of
linear measures is avoided by the more general formulation of (1). (1) escapes this drawback since
U(y) does not have to be afﬁne in incomes. Only when the marginal utility of income U0(y) is
constant across y is the social value of a mean-preserving transfer independent of the value of the
incomes of the transfer recipient and transfer giver.
S-Gini social evaluation functions are members of single-series Ginis, which are themselves
members of the generalised Gini class (see Donaldson and Weymark (1980)). These classes of
indices share interesting properties. Mehran (1976) shows that the generalised Gini inequality
indices can be easily graphically interpreted as weighted areas between Lorenz curves and lines of
perfect equality. Weymark (1981) shows that the (absolute version of the) class of generalised Gini
indices is the only one which obeys an axiom of weak independence of income source (“when the
distribution of income from all but one source of income is the same in two distributions, overall
inequality is determined by the inequality of the last source”). Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994) and
Weymark (1995) also show that the class of generalised Gini indices is the only one which obeys an
axiom of order-preserving-transfer. This axiom requires for our purposes that a common transfer of
individual utility U(y) made simultaneously in two distributions between pairs of individuals who
occupy adjacent ranks in the income distributions should preserve the pre- and post-transfer social
evaluation ranking of the distributions. Blackorby et al. (1994) demonstrate that the members
of the class of generalised Gini indices provide a class of solutions to cooperative bargaining —
solutions which respond by the same constant to a constant addition to one agent’s component in
the feasible set of utility vectors.
For the subclass of single-series Ginis, the weights on the individual U(yi) arranged in decreas-
ing order are independent of population size, that is, gn
i = gi. This leads to the social evaluation







Bossert (1990) shows that this property is needed if an axiom of separability of the well-being of
the rich from the rest of the population is to be obeyed.
S-Ginis form the only subclass of single-series Ginis to satisfy the Dalton Population Principle,
by which the addition to a population of an exact replica of that population should not change the
social evaluation function. Let yq be a q¡fold replica of y:
y
q = (y;¢¢¢ ;y | {z }
q times
): (8)
W satisﬁes the Dalton Population Principle if W(yq) = W(y), for all y 2 Rn
+ and for all q =
1;2;:::. If we add to this requirement the one of yielding Lorenz-consistent relative inequality
indices, we are led to a particular form for the social evaluation functions deﬁned in (7), as shown
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The social evaluation functions W deﬁned in equation (7) (with g1 = 1) are in-
creasing in yi, obey the principle of population and yield a Lorenz-consistent relative inequality
index if and only if
gi = gi(½) ´ i
½ ¡ (i ¡ 1)
½ (9)





(1¡²) if ² 6= 1
a + bln(y) if ² = 1
(10)
and ½ ¸ 1, ² ¸ 0 and b > 0.
Proof: See the appendix.
Note that
Pn





[i½ ¡ (i ¡ 1)½]U²(yi)
n½ : (11)
Berrebi and Silber (1981, p.393) have in fact already proposed two decades ago a generalised
version of this form, although they did not at the time investigate its properties1. W½(y) is obtained
by replacing U²(y) in (11) by the general form U(y). The families of EDE incomes and inequality
indices corresponding to W½;²(y) are denoted by »½;²(y) and I½;²(y). We can draw on well-known













This says that the higher the aversion to income inequality, or the higher the aversion to rank
inequality, the lower is the EDE income and the higher is the inequality index.
The dual-parameter structure of W½;² thus offers extra ethical ﬂexibility in the speciﬁcation of
the type of inequality aversion that may be of concern to an analyst. Duclos, Jalbert and Araar
(2000) also show that this class of social evaluation functions can provide an ethically ﬂexible
decomposition of the total redistributive effect of taxes and transfers into a vertical equity effect
and a horizontal equity one. Drawing on the dual dimension of the social evaluation functions W½;²
also allows a synthesis of two approaches to the measurement of horizontal inequity, the reranking
(see Feldstein (1976), Atkinson (1979) and Plotnick (1981)) and the classical approaches (see for
instance Duclos and Lambert (2000))2.
For the continuous setting, we denote by yF(p) the p-quantile of the distribution of income.
yF(p) is the left inverse of the distribution function p = F(y), deﬁned by yF(p) = inffs >
0jF(s) ¸ pg for p 2 [0;1], and can be thought of as the income of the p-ranked individual. As for
equation (13) in Donaldson and Weymark (1983), W½(y) for a discrete distribution corresponds to





1See Wang and Tsui (2000) and Aaberge (2000) for recent surveys and formulations of other rank-based social
evaluation functions.
2See also Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) for an inﬂuential attempt to consider jointly these two approaches.
4where w(p;½) = ½(1 ¡ p)½¡1, an ethical weight on individual utility that depends on the indi-
vidual’s rank p and on the parameter ½. This is also the formula found in Kakwani (1980) and
Yitzhaki(1983) when U(y) = y. »½(F) and I½(F) are deﬁned accordingly. Replacing U(y) by
U²(y) in (14), we obtain W½;²(F) as a special case of W½(F).
Integration by parts of equation (14) yields an alternative method for computing the social







where k(p;½) = ½(½ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ p)½¡2, and where GLU
F(p) =
R p
0 U(yF(q))dq is the generalised
Lorenz curve (see Shorrocks (1983)) of utilities. It can also be shown that a convenient way to
compute these indices is through a simple covariance formula:




0 U(yF(p))dp is average utility. The second term (the covariance between utilities
and a decreasing function of ranks) is negative, and captures the loss of social welfare due to
inequality in utility – the term is equal to the distance between average (¹U) and expected (W½(F))
rank-weighted utility.
Note that the estimation of the functions (14) (as well as that of numerous other indices of in-
equality, social welfare, poverty and redistribution) using sample data can be done using a free and
user-friendly software, DAD, that is available at www.mimap.ecn.ulaval.ca. Sampling weights can
easily be incorporated in the calculations. This software also calculates the asymptotic sampling
distribution of these and other indices.
3 Relative deprivation
We now show how the social evaluation functions introduced above can serve to incorporate in-
terpersonal comparisons of utility in the assessment of social welfare. Such interpersonal compar-
isons have long been of concern in the socio-psychological literature, which shows that exclusion
and interpersonal differences have an impact both on individual well-being and on social cohesion
andsocialwelfare3. Inparticular, thetheory ofrelativedeprivationsuggeststhat peoplespeciﬁcally
compare their individual fortune with that of others in establishing their own degree of satisfaction
with their own lives.
In the words of Runciman (1966) (an important contributor to that theory), ”the magnitude of
a relative deprivation is the extent of the difference between the desired situation and that of the
person desiring it” (p.10). Here, we follow Yitzhaki’s (1979) and Hey and Lambert’s (1980) lead
and deﬁne for each individual an indicator of relative deprivation which measures the distance be-
tween his welfare and that of those towards whom he feels deprived, namely, those whose situation
he “desires”. As opposed to Yitzhaki (1979) and Hey and Lambert (1980), however, we use utility
and not income to measure individual welfare. Hence, let ±(pi;pj) represent the relative utility
3For more speciﬁc references to this literature, see for instance Duclos (1998).
5deprivation of an individual at rank pi in the distribution of income, when comparing himself with
an individual at rank pj in the same distribution:
±F(pi;pj) = max[0; U(yF(pj)) ¡ U(yF(pi))]: (17)
This says that no relative deprivation is felt by i when he compares himself to an individual
j that is less well-off then he is. Otherwise, relative deprivation is captured by U(yF(pj)) ¡
U(yF(pi)). Aggregating this relative deprivation over all individuals j, we ﬁnd the following





If we then take an average of dF(pi) across all individuals i, and weight each such expected







This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The social evaluation functions W½ can be interpreted as average utility corrected
by average relative deprivation in utility:
W½(F) = ¹U(F) ¡ D½(F): (20)
Proof: See the appendix.
The expression D½ in (20) being identical by deﬁnition to the covariance term in (16), we also




functions. Let an individual at rank p randomly observe ½ ¡ 1 other individuals in the population.
Denote the incomes of these random individuals by y(p1);y(p2);:::; y(p½¡1). Let the enlarged
altruistic well-being function of an individual at rank p equal his egoistic utility function U(y(p))
plus an altruistic utility component. Think of this altruistic utility as expressing a concern for the
well-being of those with low utilities among the ½ ¡ 1 individuals that an individual randomly
observes. More precisely, deﬁne the altruistic well-being component function as the difference
between the egoistic utility function U(y(p)) and the minimum of the utilities of the other ½ ¡ 1
individuals, when the difference is positive. Denoting this difference as ®F(p;½), we have:
®F(p;½) = U(yF(p)) ¡ min[U(yF(p1));::;U(yF(p½¡1))]: (21)
We then obtain aF(p;½) as the altruistic well-being component:
aF(p;½) = max[0;®F(p;½)]: (22)
6Total utility at rank p is then
AF(p;½) = U(yF(p)) ¡ aF(p;½): (23)
This leads to the following proposition:






Proof: See the appendix.
5 Graphical interpretation
Yitzhaki (1983, p.264) shows how each of the two families incorporated in equation (11), the
Atkinson and the S-Gini indices, have a common dual graphical interpretation as a weigthed dis-
tance of the cumulative distribution function curve from the ordinate (for the Atkinson indices)
and from the abscissa (for the S-Ginis). Figure 1 generalises this interpretation for the general
formulation of equation (11). Population ranks p are shown on the horizontal axis, and the utility
quantiles U(y(p)) = y(p)1¡²=(1 ¡ ²) are shown on the vertical axis. The curve is thus the inverse
distribution function of utilities. The contribution of each individual i in the computation of W½;²
is the area of the rectangle of height U(y(pi)) – the individual’s utility – and of length ½(1¡p)½¡1,
a distance between his rank pi and the top rank (1). The larger the area of the rectangle, the greater
the contribution of the individual to social welfare. Social welfare is then simply the average area
of all such individual rectangles. When ½ = 2, social welfare is twice the average size of the
rectangles of the type shown in Figure 1. The traditional Gini social evaluation function, W2;0,
equals twice the size of all of these rectangles when their height is simply y(p). The traditional
Atkinson social evaluation function, W1;² is the simple integral of the height of the rectangles,
(1 ¡ ²)¡1 R 1
0 y(p)1¡²dp. The more averse we are to rank inequality, the more concerned we are
about (1 ¡ p) in weighting the individual utilities. Loosely speaking, for a given ½ and ², so-
cial welfare is largest when there exists no negative correlation between the vertical and horizontal
lengths of the individual rectangles. When such a correlation equals zero, W½;² reaches a maximum
value of ¹1¡²=1 ¡ ².
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a family of social evaluation functions W½;² and of associated inequality indices
which merges the features of the family of Atkinson and S-Gini indices. Parameters ² of aversion
to income inequality and ½ of aversion to rank inequality characterise the individual members of
that family. The family of social evaluation functions is shown to be the only one to obey a set
of popular axioms in the income distribution literature. The functions can be interpreted as av-
erages of utility corrected for relative deprivation in individual utility, or as averages of altruistic
7well-being in the population, thus providing two alternative ways in which to incorporate interper-
sonal utility comparisons. Graphically, they are simply interpreted as averages of the product of
individual utility and a rank-corrected aggregative weight.
7 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1.
Note ﬁrst that Lorenz consistency implies and is implied by the S-concavity of W(y) (see
Dasgupta et al (1973)). Further, W(y) is S-concave if and only if it does not decrease after a mean
preserving progressive transfer. We consider ﬁrst the sufﬁciency of conditions (9) and (10).
a)Sufﬁciency
i) If ½ ¸ 1; ² ¸ 0 and b > 0, then W(y) is S-concave.
Proof: Consider ﬁrst a mean preserving marginal transfer of income dy > 0 from a rich (j)






0(yj)] ¸ 0 (1.A)
since gk ¸ gj > 0 by ½ ¸ 1 and U0(yk) ¸ U0(yj) ¸ 0 by ² ¸ 0; b > 0. Since W(y)
is continuous in yi, dW(y) ¸ 0 even for a mean-preserving, inequality-reducing transfer
which affects the ranks. Therefore, if ½ ¸ 1, ² ¸ 0 and b > 0, W(y) is S-concave and thus
Lorenz consist.
ii) If b > 0, ² ¸ 0 and ½ ¸ 1, then W(y) is increasing in yi. This is easily checked.
iii) If gi = i½ ¡ (i ¡ 1)½, ½ ¸ 1, then W½;²(y) obeys the Dalton population principle.










j=1 [((i ¡ 1)q + j)½ ¡ ((i ¡ 1)q + j ¡ 1)½]
=
Pn
i=1 [(iq)½ ¡ ((i ¡ 1)q)½]U(yi)
(nq)½
= W½;²(y) (1.B)
Thus, W½;²(y) obeys the Dalton population principle.
iv) If U(y) = U²(y), then I½;²(y) is a relative index of inequality.
Proof: This is easily checked: I½;²(y) = I½;²(¸y), for all ¸ > 0 and for all y 2 Rn
+.
8We now turn to the necessity of (9) and (10).
b) Necessity
i) If W(y) obeys the principle of population, then by theorem 2 of Donaldson and Weymark
(1980), we must have:
gi = i
½ ¡ (i ¡ 1)
½: (1.C)
ii) If W(y) yields a relative inequality index, then it must be that U(y) = U²(y).
Proof: This is immediate from Atkinson (1970) and previous work (such as Pratt (1964)) by
thinking of gi as frequencies in a sum of U(yi).
iii) If W(y) is increasing in yi, then b > 0.
Proof: This is immediate since gi > 0 and the derivative of W(y) with respect to yi is given
by bgiy
¡²
i , and since giy
¡²
i > 0 for all values of yi > 0.
iv) If W½;²(y) is S-concave and increasing, then ½ ¸ 1.
Proof: Assume that, on the contrary, ½ < 1; then, for j < k, yj ¸ yk, and gj ¡ gk > 0.


















¤)(yk ¡ yj) (1.D)
where y¤ 2 [yk;yj] since U0(y) is continously differentiable for all y > 0. S-concavity of
W½;²(y) requires that dW(y) ¸ 0. If ² · 0, U00
² (y¤) ¸ 0, and from (1.D) dW½;²(y) · 0,
which means that W½;²(y) is not S-concave. If ² > 0, then U00
² (y¤) < 0; by choosing yj and
yk sufﬁciently close such that:




we have that dW(y) < 0. Hence, whatever the value of ², we must have ½ ¸ 1 for the
S-concavity of W(y).
v) If W(y) is S-concave and increasing, then ² ¸ 0.
Proof: Assume on the contrary that ² < 0. Consider a marginal mean-preserving progres-





²(yj)) + (gk ¡ gj)U
0
²(yk) (1.F)







9we have that dW(y) < 0. Such a choice is always posible. To see this, assume for simplicity
that k = j + 1. Then yk < yj, and since ² < 0 and b > 0, U0(yj) > U0(yk) > 0. The
right-hand side of (1.G) is therefore positive. There are two cases:
1) If ½ · 1, gk · gj, which by (1.G) leads to dW(y) < 0.
2) If ½ > 1, then note that
d(gj+1=gj)
dj < 0.
To see this, note that
d(gj+1=gj)
dj < 0 implies g0
j+1gj ¡ g0
jgj+1 < 0. If we replace gj by






½¡1 + (j + 1)
½¡1¢
< 0: (1.H)
This inequality can be seen to hold under three sets of values for ½:
a) If1 < ½ < 2, then2j½¡1 > (j¡1)½¡1+(j+1)½¡1, sincethefunctionx½¡1 isstrictly
concave. Suppose that A = (j ¡ 1)½¡1, B = (j)½¡1 and C = (j + 1)½¡1.
Then 2B > A + C. Furthermore, if we suppose that B = A + ´1 = C ¡ ´2, then
´1 > ´2 > 0 by the concavity of the function x½¡1. If we replace these results in
(1.H), we ﬁnd:
2AC < BA + BC
2AC < (C ¡ ´2)A + (A + ´1)C
´1C > ´2A: (1.I)
Since the last inequality holds, (1.H) must also hold.
b) If ½ > 2, then 2j½¡1 < (j ¡ 1)½¡1 + (j + 1)½¡1, since the function x½¡1 is strictly
convex. Hence, replacing (j ¡ 1)½¡1 + (j + 1)½¡1 by 2j½¡1 on the left-hand side
of (1.H), we ﬁnd:









Since the last inequality holds, (1.H) must also hold.









for all ﬁnite ½ > 1. Hence, it is enough to choose a sufﬁciently large value of j to
obtain that the left-hand side of (1.G) be sufﬁciently close to zero, so that (1.G) holds
and dW(y) < 0. Therefore, for S-concavity of W(y), we must have ² ¸ 0.
Proof of proposition 2.
10The proof essentially ﬂows from the proof of Proposition 1 in Duclos (2000). Using the deﬁnition
of the generalised Lorenz curve of utilities and (17) and (18), we ﬁnd that:
dF(pi) = ¹U(F) ¡ GL
U
F(pi) ¡ U(y(pi))(1 ¡ pi): (2.A)













(½¡2) ¡ [U(y(p))](1 ¡ p)
(½¡1)gdp (2.B)
Proceeding by integration by parts for the term U(y(p))(1¡p)(½¡1) by integrating U(y(p)) to yield
GLU













= ¹U(F) ¡ W½(F) (2.C)
by equation (15). This demonstrates the proposition.
Proof of proposition 3.
For the proof, note ﬁrst that by the deﬁnition of the altruistic individual well-being function,
we have that:




(½ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ q)
½¡2U(yF(q))dq: (3.A)
Equation (3.A) says that AF(p;½) is a weighted average of p’s egoistic utility function and of the
utility of those that are poorer than him. The weight (1¡p)½¡1 is the probability that the individual
with rank p ﬁnds himself the least well-off in his comparison with the ½¡1 other individuals. The
weight (½¡1)(1¡q)½¡2 is the density of an other individual (with utility U(y(q))) in the population





(½ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ q)
½¡2dq = 1: (3.B)
Let then ¯ UF(p;½)(p) =
R p











Integrating by parts the last term of (3.C):
11Z 1
0










(½ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ p)
(½¡1)U(yF(p))dp: (3.E)







½¡1U(yF(p))dp = W½(F): (3.F)
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